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ABSTRACT
According to the research in the field of intergenerational learning, a wide
range of skills are enhanced when they are developed in an intergenera-
tional teaching and learning context. Language, literacy and numeracy skills
can all be supported and extended by intergenerational models if they are
facilitated effectively. Moreover, the intergenerational learning provides a
non-threatening, reassuring learning environment and creates learning op-
portunities and activities that are relevant to the learner. In this theoretical
contribution, the author discusses the form that learning takes in an inter-
generational process, from implicit and informal learning, to enactive learn-
ing, which entails autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment and
experience. Furthermore, the author envisages the changes and challenges
to be tackled in order to promote intergenerational learning for the future.
La ricerca nel settore dell’apprendimento intergenerazionale indica che
un’ampia rosa di competenze vengono migliorate attraverso contesti di ap-
prendimento e insegnamento intergenerazionale. Le capacità linguistico-
verbali e logico-matematiche sembrano essere supportate ed allargate da
modelli intergenerazionali, se facilitate adeguatamente. Inoltre, l’apprendi-
mento intergenerazionale fornisce un contesto rassicurante per i partec-
panti, e crea opportunità di apprendimento significative. In questo contrib-
uto teorico l’autore discute i tipi di apprendimento alla base dell’apprendi-
mento intergenerazionale, dall’apprendimento implicito all’apprendimen-
to informale e l’apprendimento enattivo; queste forme di apprendimento
implicano abilità e competenze come autonomia, processi di generazione
di senso, apprendimento incarnato ed esperienza. Inoltre, l’autore consid-
era i cambiamenti e sfide che dovranno essere affrontati in future con lo
scopo di promuovere l’apprendimento intergenerazionale.
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In a single photograph, the horizon is a line from one side
of the frame to the other. Do we really see our surroundings
in this way? No, because we look around, we don’t look at.
In this way the horizon is a circle, and we are always at the
centre of the circle. Even though we define a circle visually
wherever we stand, we need not be conscious of ourselves
doing the looking, so we define a circle with a hole in the
middle. That is the human condition. As we look we also
unconsciously magnify the horizon. With the discovery of
perspective, a painter could convey distance by making ob-
jects on the horizon appear very small. But we see the hori-
zon as bigger than that. A photograph never does justice to
the ‘grand view’ to which we aspire because the hills in the
distance are smaller than we remembered. The human mind
is easily capable of imagining its surroundings from a van-
tage point above eye-level. Reality in this sense is more
map-like. It makes more sense to imagine things from above
because the brain needs less memory to make one useful
picture – like a template – from which to infer necessary in-
formation as we move about. It may be the case that our
perception and our cosmology are intimately bound togeth-
er, and that discovering the meaning of lost cultures will re-
quire the simple question to be answered: How did they
look at their surroundings? 
Mark Johnston 1997
Introduction: the culture of Intergenerational Learning
Intergenerational learning is apparent in the parenting styles of adult children,
with many choosing not to inflict upon their children the harsh parenting they
experienced as children. However, we continue to say that the specific mecha-
nism for intergenerational transmission and the actual effects of father involve-
ment is difficult to determine. Children who grow up in healthy, happy families
appear to assume their role as parents with positive attitudes. Despite the typical
reference to parents and children in intergenerational studies, grandparents and
often great grandparents are increasingly a source of support and may con-
tribute to children’s attitudes and beliefs as much as parents. Relationships be-
tween parents and adult children appear strongest for mothers and daughters,
with mothers having more influence on daughters’ perceptions of gender roles.
Children whose fathers were present and involved in the home report the great-
est comfort around issues of sexuality. Parents seemingly affect adult children’s
attitudes and behaviours most often in religious practices and beliefs, political
activism, and educational values, with some differential effects appearing in
mothers’ influence on daughters’ activism and fathers’ influence on sons’ reli-
gious practices. There is still no clear-cut evidence about the effects of divorce,
although increasingly studies draw a connection between divorce and several
negative behaviours and experiences such as single parenting in the next gener-
ation. The effect that is most harmful is a decline in a family’s standard of living
which may explain some of the different outcomes for children. A consistent
finding, however, is that compared with children from most intact homes, chil-
dren of divorce consider divorce a viable alternative to marital conflict. Howev-
er, children in unhappy, conflictual homes also share this view. Our conclusion
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is that children’s behaviours reflect the beliefs and practices of their parents and
families, sometimes in concordance and other times in reaction. But the ques-
tion is: What information are parents transmitting to their children, and is this in-
formation transmitted intergenerationally? 
The implications of the studies on intergenerational learning are not neatly
packaged into research, practice, and policy, nor does the separation of the three
domains serve our purposes well here. In general, research needs to expand the
subject and informant pool in order to understand how learning occurs in differ-
ent populations and across social classes. There seems to be some disjuncture
between researchers’ talk about a more diverse society and changing family
forms and the research practices they use to focus disproportionately on middle-
class families. In addition, research might consider the ways in which families of
color are studied, presented, and represented. There is an impending urgency
around adolescent parenting and the poverty within female-headed households,
many of which are disproportionately African American and Latino. After, there
is a theme throughout the existing literature that grandparents contribute in
meaningful ways to their grandchildren’s learning and that the natural impact of
their contributions are affected by differences in cultural norms. With increases
in the divorce rate and reliance on families of origin, the role of grandparents in
intergenerational learning acknowledges the centrality of multiple generations
in many families. The role of grandmothers, which has been the focus of most
discussions, should continue to be the center of studies, particularly those ad-
dressing the changing roles of grandmothers. 
The intergenerational effects of parenting are consistent with our intuitive
sense that children in happy, generally non conflictual, intact families will expe-
rience fewer problems with parenting than those who grew up in homes where
there were conflictual parent relationships. Although we should continue to ex-
amine the intergenerational effect of these “healthy” homes, substantial work—
much of it painful—needs to focus on the negative consequences of homes in
which there is abuse and the differential effects of father involvement and ab-
sence. That is, does a dysfunctional or abusive father have a greater impact than
a dysfunctional or abusive mother? Other issues range from the impact of child
and child-observed abuse to adolescent and adult children’s imitation of behav-
iours around alcoholism, drug use, and psycho-emotional well-being. 
The absence of a critical discourse on the intergenerational impact of fathers
on children’s educational beliefs and practices signals a need to transform the
culture of fatherhood and fathering. The transition in gender roles over the past
20 years suggests that the responsibility for children’s education as “women’s
work” is neither applicable nor advantageous. Here, the connections among re-
search, policy, and practice are obvious. As research develops more intensive
and expansive designs to identify parents’ impact on children’s educational
choices and on their ability to persist, practice must construct effective ways to
invite parents into children’s educational experiences and sustain their participa-
tion in the learning process. Policies for the establishment of government sup-
ported intergenerational and parenting programs might build into grants incen-
tives for grantees to include fathers over the course of the program (recognizing
the evolutionary and difficult nature of recruitment) and increase support for re-
search and evaluation components that encourage researchers and practitioners
to work collaboratively in the development and implementation of the pro-
grams. The intergenerational impact of divorce is apparent in many of the stud-
ies. More basic studies and secondary analyses are needed, however, to support
the sweeping generalizations that are made about the impact of father absence
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from a relatively small core of data. In addition, the work on the effects of family
instability should make distinctions between children of never married parents
and divorced or separated parents. This work could be complemented by stud-
ies that examine the intergenerational effect of cooperative parenting, also. A
special focus might address a subset of families, to which we refer to as fragile
families. In addition, research needs to model, through more broadened con-
ceptualizations, the impact of parents’ behaviours on both sons and daughters.
The current impetus in public campaigns often includes a subtle subtext that as-
signs more attention to sons than daughters. This, of course, is a complete rever-
sal of earlier work that assumed that mothers influenced both daughters and
sons more than fathers. We suggest that we minimize this imbalance and in-
equity in the literature and in public and private discourses. 
Intergenerational learning occurs in all families, irrespective of class, race, or
culture; and fathers contribute in many ways to how children think about their
roles and abilities into adulthood. Families are biological and social structures,
providing the first intersection between individual and society. No matter what
the family pattern, intergenerational transmission seems to occur. How research,
practice, and policy contribute to this intersection will affect not only environ-
mental and social structures but also the life needs of individual members and
the survival of family cultures and family organization within and across multiple
generations—for fathers and mothers and, most important, the well-being of
their children. 
Intergenerational Learning is a learning partnership based on reciprocity in-
volving people of different ages where the generations work together to gain
skills, values and knowledge. Activities are labelled as intergenerational learning
when they fulfil three criteria: involve more than one generation, planned in pur-
pose and progressive, mutually beneficial learning which promotes greater un-
derstanding and respect between generations and, consequently, community
cohesion. The main issues addressed by intergenerational learning approaches
throughout Europe reflect the challenges of today’s European society: the digital
divide between the young and the old, drop-out rates that are still worryingly
high in some countries and literacy problems, risk of social exclusion for vulner-
able groups such as senior citizens, migrants and young people at risk.
According to research in the field of intergenerational learning, a wide range
of skills are enhanced when they are developed in an intergenerational study
(teaching learning) context. Language, literacy and numeracy skills can all be
supported and extended by intergenerational models if they are facilitated effec-
tively. Finally the intergenerational learning provides a non-threatening, reassur-
ing learning environment and creates learning opportunities and activities that
are relevant to the learner. There is evidence that intergenerational learning pro-
vides a non-threatening first step to further learning for those who perceive
learning to be irrelevant or who have had humiliating experiences in the past. 
1. Wich is the form that learning takes in an intergenerational process?
Identify the generative structure of intergenerational learning is the focus of our
inquiry, Our goal is to provide an overview of important aspects of human learn-
ing involved in intergenerational interaction between parents or adults and
joung people. So it represents an exciting but difficult challenge because human
learning is a highly complex topic. Different theories have emerged as re-
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searchers have focused on different kinds of learning. Making sense of these dif-
ferent perspectives, and giving each their just due, is a challenging task.1
For example, behaviourism views learning as the strengthening of associa-
tions between stimuli and responses. In contrast, learning from the construc-
tivist/rationalist tradition is conceptualized in terms of the growth of conceptual
structures and general cognitive abilities such as reasoning and problem solving,
Finally, the enactive perspective, representative both of the pragmatist-socio-his-
torical tradition and of phenomenological approach, views learning as being in-
tricately bound up with social interactions and cultural tools.
We believe that the timing is right for targeted efforts toward synergy to be-
come an explicit goal of educational researchers. 
The three major areas of research that we explore include (1) Implicit learn-
ing, (2) Informal learning, and (3) Enactive or generative structure of intergener-
ational learning. These three areas have tended to operate relatively independ-
ent of one another. Researchers in each of these areas have attempted to apply
their thinking and findings directly to education, and often the links between
theory and “well grounded implications for practice” have been tenuous at best.
The goal of integrating insights from these strands in order to create an enac-
tive theory of intergenerational learning. The fundamental reason for pursuing
this goal rests on the assumption that successful efforts to understand and pro-
pel human learning require a simultaneous emphasis on informal and formal
learning environments, and on the implicit ways in which people learn in what-
ever situations they find themselves. 
2. Implicit Learning
Implicit learning refers to information that is acquired without conscious recol-
lection of the learned information or having acquired it (Reber, 1967; Graf &
Schacter, 1985). There are many types of implicit learning, but a common process
may underlie all forms — the rapid, effortless, and untutored detection of pat-
terns of co-variation among events in the world (Reber, 1993). We consider that
the implicit learning reflects the view that: (a) it is implicated in many types of
learning that take place in both informal and formal educational settings, (b) it
encompasses skill learning which plays a vital role in many other types of learn-
ing, and (c) it plays a substantive role in learning about language and people
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1 Some have focused on the acquisition of skills such as learning to type, write and read
(e.g., Anderson, 1981; Bryan & Harter, 1897; LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; NRC 2000). Oth-
ers have focused on learning with understanding and its effects on schema formation
and transfer (e.g., Anderson & Pearson, 1984, Judd, 1908; NRC, 2000; Wertheimer, 1959).
Still others study the emergence of new ideas through interactions with other people
and through “bumping up against the world” (e.g., Carey, 2000; Karmiloff-Smith & In-
helder, 1974; Papert, 1980; Vygotsky, 1978). Learning theorists have also explored differ-
ent settings for learning—including, preschool, school, experimental laboratory, infor-
mal gathering spots and everyday, home and workplace settings—and they have used
a variety of measurements of learning (e.g., neurobiological, behavioral, ethnograph-
ic). Furthermore, learning theorists work at time scales that range from milliseconds of
processing time to lifespan and even intergenerational learning (e.g., Lemke, 2001;
Newell, Liu, & Mayer-Kress, 2001).
across the lifespan2. Moreover, a substantial portion of learning from media and
technology is implicit3. Across both live, face-to-face interactions and mediated
interactions, the common conclusion is that people can learn patterned regular-
ities without intending to do so and sometimes without being able to describe
the patterns they have learned. Implicit learning has educational and even evo-
lutionary value, as it enables organisms to adapt to new environments simply by
being in them (Howard & Howard, 2001). So the label “implicit learning” is not
meant to be an operationally defined category with necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for inclusion and exclusion. We focus on two domains that are prototyp-
ical cases of implicit learning and which provide much food for thought — lan-
guage learning (Kuhl, 2004; Kuhl et al., 2003) and learning about people, some-
times called “social cognition” (e.g., Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001; Flavell & Miller,
1998; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Taylor, 1996), with heavy emphasis on the former
case. Our lifelong learning about language and people begins before kinder-
garten, and in some cases important foundations are established in the first year
of life. In these domains parents are the first “teachers” and much is absorbed
through spontaneous and unstructured play.
So recent studies explore many key hypotheses: (a) implicit learning plays an
important role across the life span, starting very early in life, (b) research on lan-
guage has discovered principles of learning that emphasize the importance of
patterned variation and the brain’s coding of these patterns, and these findings
may apply across other cognitive and social domains, and (c) principles uncov-
ered through research in language and social learning raise questions about for-
mal instruction and “oversimplified” curriculum design. 
The 1990’s were dubbed “The Decade of the Brain” and produced advances in
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2 Implicit learning occurs in many domains. For example, it influences social attitudes
and stereotypes regarding gender and race (Greenwald et al., 2002), visual pattern
learning (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996), motor response time tasks (Nissen & Bulle-
mer, 1987), syntactic language learning (Reber, 1976), phonetic language learning
(Goodsitt, Morgan, & Kuhl, 1993; Saffran, 2002; Kuhl, 2004), and young children’s imita-
tive learning of the tools/artifacts of their culture and the behaviors, customs, and rit-
uals of their surrounding social group (Meltzoff, 1988b; Tomasello, 1999).
3 Only a minority of research about the effects of media and technology test purposive
effects of messages, for example, formal classroom learning from instructional media
(Mayer et al., 2004) or the ability of television news to teach citizens about how candi-
dates stand on political issues (Krosnick & Branon, 1993; Schleuder et al., 1991). More
commonly, media research examines effects that are indirect, involve automatic atten-
tional processes, and are often beyond the conscious awareness of those processing
the information. This includes the ability of media to determine the perceived impor-
tance of political issues (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Spiro & McCombs, 2004); learning
about the appropriateness of social behavior in interpersonal relationships (Glascock,
2001; Larson, 2001); the influence of media on perceptions of social reality, for example,
what people learn about the prevalence of crime (Shanahan & Morgan, 1999; Sparks &
Ogles, 1990); learning from persuasive consumer messages that occurs subliminally
(Petty et al., 2002; Trappey, 1996) or through frequent and implicit associations between
people, places and appeals (Chang, 2002; Invernizzi et al., 2003); learning about the per-
sonal qualities of prominent figures in politics and government based on how mes-
sages are framed (Benoit & Hansen, 2004; Iyengar & Simon, 1993) and on their visual
structure (e.g., cuts, camera angles, use of motion sequences) used to present informa-
tion (Mutz & Reeves, in press); and learning to control complex media such as comput-
er games (Berry & Broadbent, 1988)
neurosciences. Modern neuroscience shows the impact of experiential learning
before it can be observed in behaviour. The study of a live brain “at work” is the
new perspective. The main question is following: “What are the advantages of
knowing which brain regions are activated over time and how they are associat-
ed with behavioural and attitude changes?” The answer is not straightforward. 
Brain studies link neural underpinnings to behavioural function; they will
help us understand learning. Neurobiological studies do, however, provide cru-
cial knowledge that cannot be obtained through behavioural studies and this
provides at least three justifications for adding cognitive neuroscience to our ar-
senal of tools for developing a science of learning. First, a mature science of
learning will involve understanding not only when learning occurs but also un-
derstanding how and why it occurs. Second, neural learning often precedes be-
havior (Tremblay, 1999), offering a chance for scientists and educators to reflect
on what it means to “know” and “learn”. Third, behaviours that appear similar
may involve different neural mechanisms that have different causes and conse-
quences. Better categorization of learning, according to neural function instead
of the appearance of behavioural similarity, should allow the educational strate-
gies and policies that affect learning to be usefully grouped in ways not obvious
absent the study of brain function.
It is a common misconception that each individual’s brain is entirely formed
at birth. For educators, the idea of rapid brain organization during the early years
of life is important but can also lead to serious misconceptions (as elegantly de-
scribed by Bruer, 1999). For example, people often question whether children
who spend their early years in under-stimulating environments, will jeopardize
chances for future learning and development? The popular literature is filled
with discussions of “critical periods” for learning, and the assumption persists
that the ability to learn certain kinds of information shuts down if the critical pe-
riod is missed and learning is affected forever. 
Assumptions such as these sometimes cause teachers and parents to under-
estimate the abilities of students whose early years seemed less rich and more
chaotic than others who come to school. Brain research shows that the timing of
critical periods differ significantly depending on whether one is discussing the
visual, auditory, or language systems. Even within different systems, there is
emerging evidence that the brain is much more plastic than heretofore assumed,
and that the idea of rigid “critical periods” does not hold4.
The concept related to the “critical period” is Kuhl’s claim that early learning
both supports and constrains future learning. Neural commitment to learned
patterns also constrains future learning; neural networks dedicated to native-lan-
guage patterns do not detect non-native patterns, and in fact may interfere with
their analysis (Iverson et al., 2003). The concept of neural commitment is linked
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4 New studies by Kuhl and colleagues explored potential mechanisms underlying criti-
cal periods in early language development (e.g., Kuhl, 2004; Rivera–Gaxiola, Silva-
Peryra, & Kuhl, 2005). The idea behind the studies relies on the concept of neural com-
mitment to learn language patterns. Kuhl’s recent neuropsychological and brain imag-
ing work suggests that language acquisition involves the development of attentional
networks that focus on and code specific properties of the speech signals heard in ear-
ly infancy, resulting in neural tissue that is dedicated to the analysis of these learned
patterns. Early in development, learners commit the brain’s neural networks to pat-
terns that reflect natural language input.
to the long-standing issue of a “critical” or “sensitive” period for language acqui-
sition. If the initial coding of native-language patterns interferes with the learn-
ing of new patterns (such as those of a foreign language), because they do not
conform to the established “mental filter,” then early learning promotes future
learning and builds on the patterns already experienced, limiting (or making
more difficult) future learning of patterns that do not conform to the ones al-
ready learned. The “critical period” thus depends on experience as much as time,
and is a process rather than a window. Thus both maturation and learning deter-
mine the critical period. Maturation may “open” the period during which learn-
ing can occur, but learning itself may play a powerful role in “closing” the period
(Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl, 1999a; Kuhl, 2004).
Broadening this discussion, the neural commitment concept can be thought
of as a neural instantiation of “expertise” in any domain. Expertise in many areas
may reflect these kinds of filters on experience — filters that focus attention, and
structure perception and thought, so that we work more efficiently and thereby
freeing up our attention and energies to thinking creatively in other domains,
but also limiting an ability to think in novel ways within the area of expertise (e.g.,
Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). For example, learning algebric principles or mastering
the scientific method changes our filters (our concepts and theories), leading us
to perceive the world in a new way. This learning alters the brain’s future process-
ing of information. 
Other studies by brain and developmental scientists are relevant to a science
of learning. One example comes from children’s learning from watching other
people. This is a skill that is important both for the transmission of culture from
parents to children and in peer-group learning. The topic of imitative learning has
undergone a revolution in the past decade, as studies have revealed the ubiqui-
tous nature of imitation among humans across the lifespan (e.g., Meltzoff & Prinz,
2002). Research now shows that human beings are the most imitative creatures on
the planet. Humans imitate from birth (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) and the young
child’s capacity to learn from imitation outstrips that found in other primates such
as chimpanzees and gorillas (Povinelli, et al., 2000; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Whiten,
2002). Recently, the importance of imitative learning has been given a boost by the
discovery of “mirror neurons” that are activated whether a subject sees an action
performed by another or performs the action themselves Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogas-
si, & Gallese, 2002; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). So imitative learning
involves more than the presence of mirror neurons, and neuroscientists are trying
to determine the special, perhaps uniquely human abilities, that support our pro-
clivity for learning by observing others in the culture.
One possibility is that even a simple act of imitation is connected with per-
spective-taking and therefore is more of a social, collaborative activity than it first
appears (Meltzoff, 2005). We must consider that the adult or parent and child
rarely see the world from the same perspective. The child sees her own body and
own actions from a “first person” perspective; but we see others from a “third-
person” perspective. Imitation requires that the child watches the adult and is
able to “transform” it across differences in points of view, size, and sensory
modality. Even a simple act of imitation requires facility in identifying with others
and being able to “take their perspective.” This capacity for perspective taking
may be fundamental to humans and important to a wide range of learning activ-
ities. Indeed some have argued that the close neural coupling of self and other
that under-girds imitation may also be implicated in such other distinctively hu-
man traits as social collaboration (Rogoff, 2003), the preservation of cultural prac-
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tices involving implicit teaching and learning across generations (Meltzoff,
1988b, 2005; Tomasello, 1999), and empathy for others, where empathy is viewed
as a kind of affective perspective taking that requires us to stand in another’s
shoes (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005). 
Regardless of these theoretical views, ample research shows that young chil-
dren learn a great deal about people and cultural artifacts through imitation, and
children are influenced not just by their parents, but also by their peers and what
they see on television. To prove that infants can learn from television it is not
enough to know that young children are visually captured. They may simply be
attracted to the visually changing mosaic of colors. But the Meltzoff (1988a) study
went beyond assessing “visual interest.” In that study, 2-year-olds watched an
adult perform a novel action on TV. The children were not allowed to play with
the object, but returned to the lab after a 1-day delay, and then were presented
with the novel object for the first time. The results showed they duplicated from
memory the specific act that they had seen on TV one day earlier. 
3. Informal Learning
Some researchers use the phrase to refer to learning that happens in designed,
non-school public settings like museums, zoos, and after-school clubs. Others
use the phrase “informal learning” to focus attention on the largely emergent oc-
casions of learning that occur in homes, on playgrounds, among peers, and in
other situations where a designed and planned educational agenda is not au-
thoritatively sustained over time. If we begin by looking outside of traditional
schooling and focus our attention on children rather than adults, we note that
79% of a child’s waking activities, during their school age years, are spent in non-
school pursuits—interacting with family and friends, playing games, consuming
commercial media, and so on (NRC, 2000). If we extend this calculation to the hu-
man lifespan, the percentage of time spent outside of school, and therefore a po-
tential source of informal learning, would be over 90%. Turning to adults specif-
ically, we note that a great deal of what an adult learns in a lifetime is not “cov-
ered” in school (e.g., raising a child, saving and investing money wisely). And
even with regard to what is “covered”, it remains an open question to ask in what
ways school-based learning substantively transfers to non-school life both in oc-
cupational and every day contexts. 
On one hand, informal learning has been championed as a romantic alterna-
tive to schools, where productive proto-forms of disciplinary knowledge and
other forms of productive knowledge develop with minimal effort. A contrasting
perspective argues that informal learning leads people to form naïve and mis-
conceived ideas at odds with disciplinary knowledge (e.g., Driver, Guesne, &
Tiberghien; 1985, McCloskey, 1983), and that these everyday “naïve” ideas that
need to overcome to develop normative knowledge. Another pair of contrasting
perspectives on informal learning concerns the quality of the thinking and prac-
tices in which informal situations engage people. On one hand, some view infor-
mal learning situations as wellsprings of new knowledge and cultural produc-
tion, especially among young people (e.g., Gee, 2003(a)(b)). On the other hand,
some view informal situations as characterized by a lack of thinking and the con-
sumption of a degraded popular culture (Healy, 1991). 
The origins of the informal learning tradition are diverse and are most readi-
ly understood as an affiliated set of approaches and ideas that can be contrasted
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with mainstream psychology and educational psychology. For example, informal
learning research typically takes an ecological conceptual stance and an ethno-
graphic methodological approach, seeking to study how people learn in “their”
informal settings with sustained attention paid to “indigenous meanings and lo-
cal phenomena” (Emerson, 2001, p. 136). Research on learning and cognition out-
side of laboratory settings often has been critiqued by mainstream educational
psychology as lacking experimental control and internal validity. Informal learn-
ing research has typically placed its emphasis on ecological validity and has made
the counterargument; laboratory research is very often lacking in this type of ex-
ternal validity. The research tradition on informal learning has its origins mostly
outside of mainstream educational psychology. Ethnographic work in anthropol-
ogy established the perspective in the first half of the twentieth century, by
showing that while many non-Western societies lack formal schooling they do
not lack meaningful, everyday learning. This poses the problem of how people
learn without teaching, curricula, and schooling as conventionally understood in
Western industrialized societies. An informal learning perspective is clearly pres-
ent in Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) and is developed further
in Mead’s continuing work with Gregory Bateson. As McDermott notes, Mead
did not write much about learning theory, at least not directly; but it would be
easy to reshape her ethnographies into accounts of what the people studied
were learning from each other about how to behave, be it about adolescence in
Samoa; gender among the Arapesh, awayness among the Balinese. Her version
of the social actor, that is, the unit of analysis in her ethnographies, was in con-
stant need for guidance from others (McDermott, 2001, p. 855).
A second line of work that provides theoretical roots for an informal learning
perspective comes out of the sociological ethnography of Howard Becker and
his colleagues. Beginning in the late 1950s and finding full expression in the
1960s and early 1970s, Becker and colleagues explored questions of how and
what people learned, mostly in occupations, but also in clearly informal situa-
tions for which no curricula or schooling exists. Characteristic of the latter was
Becker’s influential article Becoming a Marihuana User (1953). In this paper Beck-
er argued against an exclusively skill-based notion of learning that has been char-
acteristic of both behaviorism (physical skills) and cognitivism (mental skills).
Becker’s critical addition was to show that learning also involved the develop-
ment of particular meanings for a skill, which were learned among other commu-
nity members. What’s important about this argument is that it focused on a type
of learning that is often understood in terms of bio-physical effects and the skills
needed to produce these effects. These studies brought significant attention to
the peer-maintained informal cultures that arose among students in formal insti-
tutions—what might be called the informal properties of formal settings. These
were among the earliest studies to locate the development of identity as a di-
mension of learning (e.g., Becker & Carper, 1956). And the concept of identity has
become central to understanding informal learning. When one is learning out-
side of school, it is as much about who one wants to be as what one demonstra-
bly comes to know. Becker’s provocation was that school, despite its labeled pur-
pose, is often a “lousy place to learn anything in.” Becker argued that it was the
specific structural properties of how school is typically organized (cf. Tyack & To-
bin (1984) on the “grammar of schooling”) when compared to other learning sit-
uations, like on-the-job training, that made it lousy. 
At about the same time Becker and his colleagues were conducting their
studies on informal learning, a movement among some psychologists began to
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establish a “comparative psychology of cognition” (Cole & Bruner, 1971). In prac-
tice, this programmatic goal led to many studies of informal learning, both with-
in non-Western cultures and within non-schooled activities in Western soci-
eties. The two most prominent contributors to this line of work at the time were
Michael Cole and Sylvia Scribner that looked to the work of Russian scientists
on human learning and cognition for inspiration (Leont’ev, 1978; Luria, 1976; Vy-
gotsky, 1962, 1978, 1987). One foundational study that influenced the compara-
tive tradition was The Logic of Non-standard English by sociolinguist William
Labov (1969). This study sought to challenge what Labov called a deprivation
view and what has come to known as the “the deficit hypothesis.”5 What Labov’s
study showed was two-fold: (1) that while different, African American speech
practices obeyed just as strict a “logic” as middle-class European American
speech, and (2) that seemingly small changes in the context of eliciting speech,
used to make research generalization about categories of people, can have a de-
cisive impact on the kinds of performance displayed by research subjects to re-
search scientists.6
A well-elaborated program of research that combined fieldwork and experi-
mentation was led by Sylvia Scribner. This approach is exemplified in Scribner’s
studies of learning and cognition among dairy workers (Scribner & Fahrmeir,
1982; Scribner, 1997a, 1997b). Scribner argued that controlled experimentation—
in the form of posed simulation tasks closely based on field observations— was
valuable in exploring specific hypotheses about human cognition and activity,
but that these claims still needed to be tested again in various fields of naturally
occurring activity. She showed how physical and mental labor were both ele-
ments of what people learned as part of everyday work and that demands of the
work environment substantially explained the distribution of these types of labor
in daily work practice. 
In addition to the research on informal learning associated with Cole & Scrib-
ner’s research laboratories (see Cole, Engeström & Vasquez (1997) for an
overview; also, Tobach, Falmagne, Parlee, Martin, & Kapelman (1997)), the early
1980s brought work by anthropologists, sociolinguists, and small subset of psy-
chologists into closer conversation, both theoretically and methodologically. An
important early volume that recognized the shared interdisciplinary space devel-
oping around informal learning was Everyday Cognition (Rogoff & Lave, 1984). A
decade later, a similar volume entitled Ethnography & Human Development (Jes-
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5 “[This view] rests on the assumption that a community under conditions of poverty
[e.g., most ethnic minority communities]…is a disorganized community, and this dis-
organization expresses itself in various forms of deficit.” (Cole & Bruner, 1971, p. 867).
6 To make this point, Labov presented the case of an African-American boy named Leon
who when interviewed at school by a skilled African American interviewer was taciturn
and “non-verbal” in response to questions. Upon review of the recordings made,
Labov and his colleagues decided to use this data as “a test of [their] own knowledge
of the sociolinguistic factors which control speech” (Labov, 1972, p. 160). When the
same interviewer spoke again with Leon, the interview was held in Leon’s room at
home, with Leon’s best friend and a bag of potato chips as part of the conversational
scene. In comparison with the first interview at school, there was a “striking difference
in the volume and style of speech” (Labov, 1969). In this situation, Leon had a lot to say,
competed for the floor, and spoke as much to his friend as to the interviewer—all
strong contrasts with the first interview situation.
sor, Colby, & Schweder, 1996) showed how far this interdisciplinary conversation
had proceeded7.
Typically, informal learning studies have found that the practices and knowl-
edge of compared settings differ in important and consequential ways, thus lead-
ing to the view that what is important or necessary to learn in each setting differs
accordingly. An early influential study of this kind was Philips’ (1983) study that
compared the participation structures and speech practices of Native American
children in school and in their cultural community contexts. Philips found that
the adults in the respective contexts—the elders of the community and the
teachers at school—differed in their expectations for children’s speech and that
these differences manifested themselves at the level of how turns at talk were al-
located. This had the effect of leading the children’s teachers, of a different cul-
tural background, to misunderstand their abilities8. Although studies of informal
learning have been used to cast a critical eye on the traditional practices of
schooling and to provide ideas for formulating alternative educational practices. 
Nearly all studies of informal learning highlight that learning happens with-
out most of the apparatus of schooling such as intentional teaching, designed
and sequenced curricula, and regular individualized knowledge assessments.
This leads researchers to try to describe the means, pathways, and practices by
which learning happens in non-school settings. Many of the alternative formula-
tions of how people learn play off concepts of apprenticeship (Lave & Wenger,
1991; Rogoff et al., 1996). Specific constructs include Lave & Wenger’s idea of le-
gitimate peripheral participation, which highlights the practices by which new-
comers are gradually enculturated into participation in existing “communities of
practice”; and Rogoff et al.’s related notion of intent participation in which learn-
ing is described as happening “through keen observation and listening, in antic-
ipation of participation…[children] observe and listen with intent concentration
and initiative, and their collaborative participation is expected when they are
ready to help in shared endeavors” (Rogoff, 2003, p. 176). Understanding learning
in this way attends to how individuals can learn without explicit teaching but
through participation in a community’s ongoing activities. 
Informal learning researchers have described other, though not necessarily
incompatible, dimensions of change when people learn. For example, a number
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7 A history of informal learning research can also be told through the places where it has
been at least partially institutionalized as a going research concern and in this regard,
two “centers” warrant special mention. The first is the Laboratory of Comparative Hu-
man Cognition (LCHC), led by Michael Cole from its inception in 1972. The second was
the Institute for Research on Learning (1986-1999), a private research institute whose
interdisciplinary research staff included anthropologists, sociolinguists, educators,
and cognitive and computer scientists. IRL is perhaps best known as the home of the
influential volume Situated Learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991), but it, like the LCHC, has a
rich and varied history of research and practical educational work related to informal
learning. Three more recent organizational settings are worth mentioning as ones
where the details of informal learning are being further studied. These are the Center
for Informal Learning and Schools (CILS), and the Learning in Informal and Formal En-
vironments (LIFE), both funded by the National Science Foundation, and the Center on
Everyday Lives of Families (CELF), funded by the Sloan Foundation.
8 Other informal learning studies that have compared contexts for learning include Saxe
(1982), Carraher, Carraher, and Schliemann (1985), Heath (1983, 2001), deAbreu (1995),
Hall & Stevens (1995), Stevens (2000a).
of informal learning researchers have described learning in terms of changing
forms of participation in ongoing cultural activities (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff
et al., 1996). Other researchers have highlighted that learning involves changes in
people’s identities—who they understand themselves to be and who others po-
sition them to be (Becker, 1953; Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998; Lave
& Wenger, 1991; Nasir, 2002; Wenger, 1999). Others have highlighted that learn-
ing, even in activities typically understood as academic or theoretical, involves
changes in tool-mediated, embodied skills (Goodwin, 2000; Rose, 2004; Stevens &
Hall, 1997, 1998; Wertsch, 1998). Though no single definition of learning unites
studies of informal learning, Hutchins’ definition of learning as “adaptive reor-
ganization in a complex system” (Hutchins, 1995) is a reasonable placeholder for
a working consensus view and one that links it to other contemporary views on
“adaptive expertise” described in the next section.
A good proportion of research in the everyday cognition and informal learn-
ing traditions documents adult activities within specific settings. In terms of set-
tings where this research has been conducted, these studies range from what is
conventionally viewed as “low brow” work (Scribner, 1997b; Beach, 1993; Rose,
2004) to “highbrow” professional work (Hall & Stevens, 1995; Hall, Stevens, and
Torralba, 2002; Hutchins, 1995; Jacoby & Gonzalez, 1991; Latour, 1995; Ochs et al,
1992; Stevens & Hall, 1998). Taken together, these studies expose the limitations
of assumed hierarchies (i.e., low to high or concrete to abstract) and entrenched
binary distinctions like “mind/body”, “expert/novice”, and “theoretical/practical”.
A similarly extensive program of research on children’s informal activities may
hold the possibility of additional theoretical reframings of how we understand
the basic categories of children’s activities and development, such as, for exam-
ple, the unexamined distinction between “play” and “work”. At a more basic lev-
el, these studies can help us understand how the demands, problems, con-
straints, and affordances of particular contexts organize stable forms of learning
and development within these contexts for children and how children organize
their own learning in contexts. Even in anthropology, ethnographic description
“of children and their agency” has been “sparse” (Das, 1998). We have just de-
scribed the ways that within context studies have challenged a variety of com-
mon distinctions. 
The distinction between “informal” and “formal” serves as an entry point in-
to our discussion of different traditions for studying learning and marks some
trough differences between self-organized, emergent learning and learning oc-
casioned by organized instruction and designed curricula. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction is limiting because, as argued from many perspectives, a setting-based
notion of context makes too many assumptions about the homogeneity of set-
tings (i.e. that all activities in places called “schools” or “homes” are similar) and
the homogeneity of experience within these settings for individual learners
(Becker, 1972; Rogoff et al., 2003; Schegloff 1992). In addition, emergent learning
may be as present in some school contexts as in out-of-school ones (Stevens,
2000a, 2000b). If we set aside the firm distinction between “informal” and “for-
mal” the foundational issue becomes the structuring properties of contexts for
learning and development, with the very nature of what constitutes a “context”
remaining an open theoretical question (Goodwin, 1992). One particular direc-
tion for further research is to identify and study exceptional informal contexts in
which young people are in control of advancing their own learning, with the goal
of understanding how people advance their own learning by assembling and co-
ordinating heterogeneous resources (Barron, review; Becker, 1972; Crowley & Ja-
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cobs, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991). As with any field-based scientific discipline, we
need to better understand the distribution of “ecological niches” in which chil-
dren are most actively engaged, and study how the problems that emerge in
these non-school settings make new knowledge necessary and certain kinds of
thinking and action adaptive. We also have strong reason to believe that descrip-
tions of mean tendencies are insufficient, because distributions of resources and
practices vary widely by gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status, an issue of
importance for translating findings from basic research to the educational goal
of developing more equitable learning environments.
4. Enactive Learning: the magic circle of intergenerational process
There is a small but growing community of researchers spanning a spectrum of
disciplines which are united in rejecting the still dominant computationalist par-
adigm in favor of the enactive approach (e.g., Stewart et al. 2011; Torrance 2005,
2007). The framework of this approach is focused on a core set of ideas, such as
autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment, and experience. These con-
cepts are finding novel applications in a diverse range of areas. One hot topic has
been the establishment of an enactive approach to social interaction. We suggest
that this revised conception of ‘socio-cognitive interaction’ may provide the nec-
essary middle ground from which to understand the inner structure of intergen-
erational learning. In contrast to the mainstream this account of sociality begins
with an emphasis of biological autonomy and mutualy coordinated interaction.
It is recognized that the interaction process itself forms an irreducible domain of
dynamics which can be constitutive of individual agency (De Jaegher and Froese
2009) and social cognition (De Jaegher et al. 2010). 
The enactive approach was initially conceived as an embodied and phenom-
enologically informed alternative to mainstream cognitive science (Varela et al.
1991). Since then it has begun to establish itself as a wide-ranging research pro-
gram with the potential to provide a new perspective on an extremely diverse va-
riety of phenomena, reaching all the way from the single cell organism to human
society (Thompson 2007). Moreover, the ongoing search for novel theoretical
and methodological foundations has led to a series of systematic confrontations
with some of the hardest questions known to philosophy and science: What de-
fines cognition? What is the relationship between life and mind? What defines
agency? What is special about social forms of interaction? What is the role of cul-
ture for human learning? The research framework of this approach is inherently
trans-disciplinary and driven by fundamental questions that are organized
around the core ideas of autonomy, sense-making, emergence, embodiment,
and experience (Di Paolo et al. 2011). The advantage of this conceptual coher-
ence is a discourse that can integrate a diverse set of observations which are oth-
erwise separated by disciplinary discontinuities. This trans-disciplinary integra-
tion has to proceed along a delicate middle way: neither an eliminative reduc-
tionism nor a mysterious dualism will do. Observations drawn from distinct re-
gions of phenomena must retain a relative independence with respect to each
other. 
Through the studies of Francisco Varela on the fundamental role played by
the sensory-motor coordination in cognition, we can show recurring patterns in
the learning process of the person, focusing on interdependent relationships
among perception, emotion and action, which define a self-organizing system
U
m
b
er
to
 M
ar
gi
o
tt
a
36
that allows the emergence of coherent meanings for all persons involved in in-
tergenerational process. These relationships are based on the activity of the en-
tire body, allowing the emergence of both the „inner world of the person and
what she considers her „outer  world, in a process of generating interrelated and
consistent meanings. Starting from Francisco Varela s studies on enaction, our
aim is to outline the meanings that parents and sons give to everyday experi-
ences and to reality, as emergent phenomena from the sensory-motor couplings
with the context, rather than ready-made information that they extract from a
pre-given world. Through the theory of complexity, we place at the center of our
investigation the personas the source of her knowledge. Knowledge is her em-
bodied know-how that thery learn to recognize and observe through the help of
others. So, we must be obliged to consider learning as a process of cooperation
and mutual coordination in which the relational aspect becomes the foundation
of all knowledge, rather than an adaptive ability to a given context. Through the
personal perception of the world in which parents and sons or adults and young
take part by acting in it, they enter the context that changes while they transform
themselves. Therefore we are obliged to define the personal learning as the
process that occurs between the person and her context when they relate to
each other, through which the person changes herself – not only at a purely cog-
nitive level, but in every part of her body – changing her context: it is a form of
embodiment of experience and cognition.
We may differentiate the intergenerational learning process of a living being
and, in general, its cognition, in two main ways: the first considers the learning
process as an adaptive necessity of the individual to its environment, the second
considers the learning process as a co-generative modality between the individ-
ual and the environment: the enactive approach to cognition and experience.
Traditionally, the environment is considered dominant over the living beings;
they have to conform to it to survive. Under this approach, subject and environ-
ment are separated and the only relationship that binds them is the direct causal
link input / output from one to another, without any form of interdependence.
The relationship between them is therefore an instructive one-way. The frame of
reference is the traditional cause and effect relationship, the behaviour of living
being appears to be appropriate only if it is able to adapt as best possible to a giv-
en context, according to a classical approach of „problem solving  skills of the
nervous system. Learning becomes a process that finds its „raison d’être  outside
the person: it is the environment, both natural and social – the external reality –
that defines and specifies a process of adaptation for the subject. This view im-
plies a sort of „cognitive realism :cognition is grounded in the representation of
a pre-given world by a pre-given subject. 
But the learning process can not only be understood as a process that em-
bodies a causal relationship with the environment; it can also be understood as
a phenomenon that may have its origin in the inter-relationship established be-
tween the subject and its environment. In this case, learning can be considered
as an emerging phenomenon that occurs when subject and environment come
into relationship in a dynamic and recursive process. The learning that emerges
from this connection is a generative phenomenon that influences both the sub-
ject and its context. 
Francisco Varela has repeatedly stressed in his studies that the process of cog-
nition is strongly related to the possibility that we, as living beings, have to cope
with our milieu through our bodies. The context in which we interact is some-
thing we take part in: touching, seeing, tasting, moving in it. The term enaction
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emphasizes precisely this possibility of emergence: to make active, to bring forth
something that through our manipulation appears real in itself. According to en-
action, essential elements of cognition are the dynamic sensory-motor skills of
the person: it is through the ability to perceive and act in one’s own context that
can trigger a process of learning, a close relationship between agent and envi-
ronment in the cognitive process. By environment we mean broadly any external
„disturbances to the person, including other people who are part of that con-
text. Maturana and Varela write in this sense of structural couplings between liv-
ing beings and their milieu to emphasize reciprocity and consistency that is es-
tablished between one another, without any prevalence of one over the other.
Each of them – living being and environment – is only a trigger for the other that
can give rise to reciprocal structural changes, in their material manifestation.
Once those changes occur, we can speak of structural coupling between a living
being and its environment and viceversa. It is through these repeated structural
couplings that one can speak of cognitive process, since every action becomes
in itself a cognitive act, an experience that is embodied in the person. The body
becomes a central tool – an ontological machine – to take part in one’s own real-
ity by defining the boundaries and possibilities of understanding. According to
enaction, it is therefore relevant to study how the human being acts in its local
situations and how these local situations change constantly as a result of its ac-
tivity. There is a fundamental circularity between action and experience that al-
lows both the embodiment of these changes in the living being, and the emer-
gence, through these actions, of the context within it operates. Intelligence is no
longer the ability to solve problems already given, but rather the ability to access
a common world. The living system is able to maintain its identity through a cir-
cular process of interaction with the environment and of self-reproduction; all
interactions operating within the network of cognitive acts are coordinated be-
tween perceiver and perceived. The cognitive process becomes the evolution of
living organisms along a path chosen by them in the course of time in their struc-
tural couplings. Time thus becomes a key aspect in the analysis of cognition and
learning, in which the personal history of a being becomes an embodied know-
how: skills learned and experiences are full of all those aspects that make its his-
tory unique, defining it as a specific identity.
The closed circular organization of the lived body defines a field of dynamic
interactions in intergenerational process, creating a boundary which defines the
unit system as a specific identity, according to the principles of self-organization.
The focus is therefore on the nexus among the components that define the or-
ganization of the intergenerational interaction system, and not on individual,
material components, which define the structure instead. While the structure ac-
tually occurs while changing, the underlying network organizational structure
and its dynamics seem more diaphanous, having no substantial and material ex-
istence. However, it is the continuity of these connections that allows the life and
the sense-making process of intergenerational learning. 
The key point is that such systems do not operate by representation. Instead
of representing an independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinc-
tions that is inseparable from the structure embodied by the cognitive system. ‘I
see if I act, I act if I see’. The intergenerational process’s actors comes into con-
tact with the surrounding environment through structural couplings which gen-
erate its own inner world related to the environment, as a dynamic process of
mutual co-definition. Perception, unlike what we are led to believe, is accom-
plished with the body and through the body, becoming a global experience that
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involves the whole person together with her context. The brain participates in
the process of perception as an active configuration of interactions between the
environment and the body: the structure of the perceiver is closely interrelated
with the perceived reality. Perception, into intergenerational process, is an active
process involving not only our senses but also our nervous system, including the
brain, our body in general and the environment in which we are immersed. Enac-
tive learning emphasizes two fundamental and interrelated aspects: first, that
cognition consists of perceptually guided actions. This aspect shifts attention
from the signals coming from the outer world to the way the person guides her
actions in her local situation, through her sensory-motor system. Second, that
cognitive structures emerge from recurrent sensory-motor patterns that enable
perceptually guided actions. It is no longer the outer world that specifies a per-
ception, but rather the inner world, the embodied sensory-motor patterns, that
guides actions while changing the external environment as a result of its activity.
This is what is meant by the inseparability of the perceiver from its reality. This is
also the relevance of repeated interactions as an evolutionary path of the system
over time, and the importance of complex dynamic systems studies to under-
stand the evolution of intergenerational process. There is therefore a strong in-
terdependence between what we call culture of intergenerational process and
the dept structure of intergenerational learniing of a person. There is thus a vi-
sual control of action, and viceversa; objects become “hypotheses of action” for
our body, transforming them into a life experience. This intergenerational expe-
rience is embodied in us as a habit of which we are unaware: perception is a phe-
nomenon that can be determined only if there is a relationship between what we
usually call subject – the perceiver – and what we commonly call the object
–what is perceived through action. So the intergenerational patterns are recur-
sive and capable of self-organizing and self-generating, according to a circuit that
generates not only itself but also the meaning of action and the reality with
which it interferes.
Emotions are the immediate meaning of intergenerational experience. She is
given to what is experienced and that exceeds and precedes the rational-logical
meaning, representing the feedback loops of the cognitive system. Every cogni-
tive act is modulated by emotions; they function as a system of self-regulation,
defining the cognitive process as a self-organized system. In this process emo-
tions become the feedback loops that amplify and reinforce (positive feedbacks)
or that self-regulate (negative feedbacks) the belief system and the thought pat-
terns through which we perceive the external reality and the whole experience.
In the intergenerational experience the basic emotional systems may act as
“strange attractors”, that show recurring patterns in the learning process of the
person, focusing on interdependent relationships among perception, emotion
and action, which define a self-organizing system that allows the emergence of
coherent meanings for the person. These relationships are based on the activity
of the entire body, allowing the emergence of both the “inner” world of the per-
son and what she considers her “outer” world, in a process of generating inter-
related and consistent meanings. This circular process defines the evolutionary
history of ones cognitive system, defining a unique memory in a process that de-
termines the historical memory itself as irreversible. The cognitive process in-
volves continuous changes of the system: perception, emotion, and behavior, in
a continuous transformation and generation of the self, without ever returning
to previous states. This process is what we call personal learning circle a long an
evolutionary path that is quite unique. Each time there is a different experience
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that is stratified, as if this model is theoretically infinite, while maintaining the
same type of movement, represented schematically as a strange attractor. The ex-
perience is stratified, becoming a long-term memory by changing the structure
of the attractor and continuously transformed into embodied knowledge. This
double loop determines within it a coherent world, with a sense and meaning,
whose boundary becomes its own cognitive domain: the system itself produces
its own world, according to a recursive process constantly changing, just like a
fractal or a strange attractor. It is a pattern that represents the principle of self-or-
ganization of intergenerational cognitive processes, closed with respect to its
surroundings. The cognitive process is therefore the individual learning process,
in the context of its evolutionary process. So the enactive learning is a pattern
representing a double-closed circle of learning when the person enters into a re-
lationship with her own environment, highlighting how the recurrence of inter-
relationships between perceptions, emotions and actions become incarnate in
her personal experience. This pattern takes the form of a strange attractor, in
which the emotional aspect is the central point of activity, the diaphragm, be-
tween perceiving and acting, between the emergence of the inner world and the
emergence of contextual outer world, between the self and the other, along a cir-
cle that repeats itself endlessly, and yet is finished, closing the space of possibil-
ities, The enactive learning structures a knowledge embodied in the person that
is expressed in her behavior, her language, her emotions, her perceptions, and
that defines her history and memory. The recurrent experience becomes a know
how of the person, which manifests itself in the naturalness of everyday life. It is
a dynamic and evolving process, a real learning process: the process of learning
is a process of signification, in which any action, any interaction, has a meaning
within a coherent network of meanings. It is this body of skills ready to be acti-
vated automatically without the need to think up that we can define, together
with Francisco Varela, as the know-how embodied in the person: it is the ability
to immediately cope with the surrounding world, that readiness for action that
allows the emergence of micro-worlds within which a person can easily move.
Therefore, the structure of the intergenerational experience embodies the histo-
ry of its continual changes; this process of ongoing structural changes keeps firm
the identity of the subject. Through this enactive learning process we define our
own identity, with reference to our environment, as a form of differentiation of
ourselves from the environment. The emergence of our inner world, according
to this analysis, is something intangible and not concretely defined. This is in fact
a process that can emerge from the intertwined elements and their iteration,
namely the continuous repetition of similar phenomena, although never identi-
cal, giving rise to a seemingly constant reality, as something stable, although al-
ways in motion and always co-determining in a seamless flow. In this generative
process, named as enactive learning, cognition is represented as a process of
transformation of the person, both inside and outside herself, changing her in-
ternal world and, simultaneously, changing her own context. This process is gen-
erative only if we acknowledge the other with whom we dependently co-gener-
ate. It becomes an infinite and indefinite iteration at the same time, that does not
begin and end anywhere, with the emergence of coherent meanings in a com-
mon cognitive domain. Learning can thus be seen as a process of cooperation
and mutual coordination, in which the relational aspect becomes the foundation
of all knowledge. Through the personal perception of the world in which we take
part with an action, the domains of self and other are intertwined making it im-
possible to remain outside.
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5. The future: changes and challenges in intergenerational learning
We can look into the future in different ways. At one level the predicted patterns
of ageing might not surprise us. People will live longer and healthier lives and as-
suming the reduction in fertility rates continues. Although there will be transient
effects such as the ‘age wave’ resulting from the high fertility rates, there will con-
tinue to be a large representation of older people and different generations of
families with relatively few offspring co-existing. We may also be unsurprised
about the forecast that with continuing rates of migration, ethnic diversity will al-
so become more widespread in Europe. We might also make a reasonable guess
at the career involvement and the prevalence of working mothers as well as fa-
thers increasing within the system with the consequent reduction of availability
of within-family childcare. We might also be quite comfortable predicting that
technology may not only change but become more available. What may be more
difficult to predict, however, is how the different trends might interact. For exam-
ple, while there is more scope for ethnic diversity within families, the cultural ef-
fects are not certain. It is not certain, for example, to what extent immigrant
groups will become assimilated, nor how acculturation will take effect, so that the
values, the culture and the customs merge with the majority population with
time. Conversely, some communities might retain a strong heritage and cultural
identity. There may be further tensions in retaining identity if family members are
dispersed geographically because of economic demand and globalisation. While
information and communication technologies have the power to enable younger
family members to become independent and lose their cultural identity they can
also, at the same time, facilitate cultural contact within and across national bound-
aries. It is likely that the continued weakening of horizontal household ties
through divorce and other instabilities in relationships will mean that vertical in-
tergenerational links and influences will become more important (Owen et al,
2004). However, this will also be in a context where an increased active lifespan to-
gether with employment rights for the elderly may mean that those family mem-
bers who in the past have played this role may become more likely to take on the
pivotal role of working and supporting those both younger and older than them-
selves (Dench and Ogg, 2002). We do not know how family members will contin-
ue to balance these demands and whether families can remain as coherent cohe-
sive units. We do not know whether grandparents will continue to have the time
for childcare and that special bond and, for that matter, whether grandfathers
rather than grandmothers will have to play a greater role.
The challenge for some minority communities could be in terms of maintain-
ing a heritage identity. Even if there are collective communal initiatives that sup-
port this, the role of the family could be crucial in this respect. While grandpar-
ents have been an active source of cultural knowledge and practice in the past,
how this role might be picked up by future generations is less certain. In addi-
tion, particular occupations and the associated skills are less likely to remain sta-
ble within a given family and so learning needs could become less predictable.
In turn this could affect the status of older generations as authoritative sources
of information and skills. We are also living at a time when information is not on-
ly much more readily accessible but also is there in greater variety, quantity, de-
tail and abundance.
Work patterns will affect what goes on within families. Apart from the possi-
bility of a longer active life which has career implications, the demands of the
labour market in response to shortages of particular skills will mean that patterns
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in work, training and education will change when viewed from a life-long per-
spective. The blurring of boundaries between living, working and learning cur-
rently experienced may continue to progress; particularly as new technologies,
mobile communications, and global business practices can keep people elec-
tronically connected at all times of the day and night regardless of whether they
are at a place of work, at home, or on holiday. Perhaps the biggest challenge to
families in relation to this context is managing the balance between work and
leisure – or, indeed, a new order of family life. Although flexible working patterns
could assist this process there is also the possibility that the more traditional op-
portunities for family and intergenerational interaction, such as in the evenings
and at weekends, may disappear.
In addition we know that a majority of people in the Europe may be at risk of
digital exclusion in 2040. While in the past a ‘digital divide’ has been framed in
terms of a lack of availability of digital resources, more sophisticated notions of
digital inclusion or exclusion also consider broader problems of social inclusion
and engagement. Selwyn (2002), for example, argues that access to technology in
itself is insufficient in promoting a digitally inclusive society and results from an
adult continuing education survey carried out with his co-workers (Gorard et al,
2000) support his contention that access should be meaningful, functional, and
of perceived relevance. In terms of social capital this also presents a challenge
that belongs as much to the family as in the public domain. The use of ICT in the
home can reduce the time that families interact as a whole. Sanger et al’s (1997)
work suggests that, in contrast to a family watching the same programmes on the
one and only television receiver in the house, the increased availability of tech-
nology such as video games has segregated families; parents, for example, know
very little about what their children are doing when they are each in their own
rooms in different parts of the home. We are, perhaps, living at a time when fam-
ilies could be encouraged to negotiate rules around the use of new technolo-
gies. On this basis there is a need for parents to talk to children about the dan-
gers of the internet and encourage them to look critically at the information they
find on the internet and other media. Similarly, as more mobile phones become
available, it is timely to address questions on how such technology is shaping
family life and how families are shaping the use of technology.
So, the intergenerational learning is the real and evolutionary space of more
complex relationships involving different generations including parents and
children. What we regard as enactive learning today may take on a more tangible
coherent and connected life of its own as we are able, through communication
technologies, to maintain, sustain and develop relationships. The space in which
we live and learn may no longer be defined by four walls and a roof. In this con-
text the challenge for intergenerational learning ‘actors may be one of identify-
ing and contributing to a group identity, even if this identity is dynamic in nature.
The syncretic processes could have a role to play here. The implications arising
from the possible blurring of chronological divisions of education for intergen-
erational learning are widespread. Segmentation of education may be less dis-
tinct. For example, the role of the university could become a more continuous
one where people remain connected as part of a lifelong learning community.
With regard to children’s learning and development, another challenge is for
teachers to know more about the learning that goes on within families so that
they can learn from this as well as allow their own institutional approaches
(which will be different) to interface in a sensitive way. This is still an under-re-
searched area. While studies such as the Teaching and Learning Research Pro-
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gramme’s Learning Lives (Hodkinson, Biesta, & James, 2008) have begun to con-
tribute to the literature on the kind of learning going on throughout people live
both formally and informally, further attention will still be needed in understand-
ing the different kinds of learning, cultural practices and development taking
place in a variety of out-of-school settings including the family.
Older people, of course, are not fixed entities. The older people of 2050 will
have been the younger people of today who will have taken with them not only
the practices we associate with young people today but also some of the atti-
tudes to change and flexibility that we may consider a hallmark of our time. As-
suming the infants of today will be the elders of the future then, to survive as a
responsive and flexible community in a changing world, what they will take with
them into that future will not just be the transferred remnants of yesterday but
also the ability to play their part in creating the culture of tomorrow.
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